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PART I - THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION
Intraduction
T HE development and effects of airline competition in the United
States have already stimulated a considerable postwar literature,
dealing both directly and indirectly with the subject. 2 This study repre-
sents an addition to that literature from the viewpoint of geography.
Modem geographers are interested in air and other forms of transport
insofar as they represent aspects of the spatial organization of human
activities and provide some evidence as to the nature of the complex
interrelationships existing between places. From the point of view of
students of air transportation, it is felt that the geographer's use of
maps and his emphasis on individual route characteristics in consider-
ing problems of airline competition may provide a somewhat different
view of a familiar situation. This particular paper presents a carto-
graphic history of competitive change in airline traffic from 1940 to
1 This article is the result of work being carried on at the Transportation
Center at Northwestern University. The material was developed to provide an
empirical traffic analysis in connection with a current study dealing with the role of
the Civil Aeronautics Board in the development of United States air transportation.
The author wishes to express his thanks to Richard Carter and Ronald Miller,
Transportation Fellows in geography, for assistance in cartographic and computa-
tional work.2 This includes: Frederick W. Gill and Gilbert L. Bates, Airline Competition,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949) ; Herbert H. Whitehead, "Effects of
Competition and Changes in Route Structure on Growth of Domestic Air Travel,"
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE, XVIII (Winter, 1951), pp. 78-90; Harold D.
Koontz, "Domestic Air Line Self-Sufficiency: A Problem of Route Structure,"
American Economic Review, XLII (March, 1952), pp. 103-125; David W. Bluestone,
"The Problem of Competition Among Domestic Trunk Airlines," JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW AND COMMERCE, XX, (Autumn, 1953) pp. 379-402; Gilbert L. Bates, "Current
Changes in Trunkline Competition," JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE, XXII,(Autumn, 1955) pp. 379-405; Aaron J. Gellman, "The Regulation of Competition in
United States Domestic Air Transportation: A Judicial Survey and Analysis,"
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE, XXIV, (Autumn, 1957) pp. 410-434; Samuel
B. Richmond, "Creating Competition Among Airlines," JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND
COMMERCE, XXIV, (Autumn, 1957) pp. 435-464.
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1956. The maps give both an overview of competition among the 100
leading city pairs and a view of the competitive characteristics of indi-
vidual city pairs in the visual context of other major city pairs. The
evaluation of generalizations about airline competition is aided by
noting on the maps the varying degrees of conformity of specific cases
to such aggregative generalizations.
In this study, attention will be focused on the premium air travel
markets of the United States, the 99 leading city pairs (as based on
passenger-mile production in March, 1956) .3 The use of the 99 city
pairs may be considered something of a compromise between the obvi-
ously impractical alternative of considering all city pairs and the
obviously biased alternative of selecting isolated city pairs to illustrate
certain competitive characteristics. The degree of concentration of air
traffic is such that these 99 pairs accounted for nearly half of U. S. total
passenger-miles during March, 1956 despite the fact that there are many
thousands of city pairs with scheduled air service. The degree of par-
ticipation in high-density traffic such as this is of considerable impor-
tance to an airline (although the relation of such economies of scale
to profits is a complex and uncertain one). Koontz attributes much of
the regional carriers' weakness to their small share of these markets.4
A study of Chicago's air traffic also indicated a high degree of concen-
tration on premium markets.5 Two or three cities accounted for 50
per cent of the Chicago passenger-miles for most of the airlines con-
cerned. Thus, a close examination of the measurable extent of competi-
tive change as reflected in traffic maps of the 99 city pairs would seem
to be helpful in attaining a better overall understanding of airline
competition.
In the first part of this two-part study, the 99 city pairs will be
mapped and examined in terms of the nature and extent of airline
competition among them. The development of these competitive char-
acteristics will then be traced in a series of maps designed to establish
realistic categories for the consideration of the effects of competition on
traffic growth. The second part of the paper (to appear in the next
issue of the JOURNAL OF ATR LAW AND COMMERCE), will deal with the
patterns of traffic growth among the 99 city pairs for selected periods.
The hypothesis that competition is associated with growth will be
tested against the competitive categories established in the first part of
3 For purposes of comparison with previous city pair figures, Tampa-Chicago
and St. Petersburg-Chicago, both of which were among the 100 leading passenger-
mile generators in March, 1956, were considered as a single city pair. The term
"premium markets" will be used interchangeably with "leading city pairs" to refer
to these 99 pairs. The term "route" will also be used occasionally to refer to citypairs. All maps were compiled from two-way origin-destination data in: Civil Aero-
nautics Board, Airline Traffic Survey, Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office and Air Transport Association, Origination-Destination Airline Revenue
Passenger Survey, Airline Finance and Accounting Conference, Washington, D. C.March and September totals were used in all cases but 1940 where September
figures alone are used.
4 Koontz, op. cit.
5 Edward J. Taaffe, The Air Passenger Hinterland of Chicago, University of
Chicago, Department of Geography Research Paper No. 24, (University of Chicago
Press: 1952), p. 87.
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the paper. Attempts will also be made to separate the effects of compe-
tition from certain other growth factors.
The basis for mapping competitive and growth characteristics of
the 99 leading city pairs is provided by Figure 1. The degree of con-
centration was such that traffic to and from the four major centers
(New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami) accounted for 87 of the
99 leading pairs in March, 1956. Three additional centers accounted
for the remaining 12 (Washington, Tampa, San Francisco) . This made
possible the cartographic representation of the passenger-mile magni-
tude of each city pair by plotting graduated circles on four inset maps,
one for each of the four major centers on which air traffic is concen-
trated. Thus, the area of the circle marked DEN on the New York map
is proportional to the number of air passenger-miles flown between
New York and Denver during a two-week period in March, 1956 and
a two-week period in September, 1956, a number which is considerably
greater than the traffic between Los Angeles and Denver, as is evident
from the smaller DEN circle on the Los Angeles map. In order to make
the inset maps complete, traffic to the three additional centers was
added in the form of graduated squares. Tampa squares were added to
the Miami map; San Francisco squares to the Los Angeles map; Wash-
ington squares to the Chicago map. Thus on the Miami map the square
above the circle representing Detroit-Miami represents the smaller
Detroit-Tampa traffic; on the Chicago map, there is a Detroit-Washing-
ton square above the Detroit-Chicago circle; and a Detroit-San Fran-
cisco square above the Detroit-Los Angeles circle on the Los Angeles
map. No city pairs are repeated since the goal is to let the four inset
maps provide a cumulative picture of the 99 city pairs rather than to
have each inset map provide a complete picture of the traffic for the
particular city. The complete Miami traffic among the 99 city pairs,
for instance, consists not only of all the city circles on the Miami map,
but also the Miami circles on the other three maps.
The disproportion between the circle sizes in Figure 1 provides
further evidence of the degree of concentration of passenger miles on
the very largest city pairs. Particularly dominant are: the long-haul
traffic from the Pacific Coast to Chicago and New York; Miami traffic
to Chicago and New York; and New York-Chicago traffic. Also con-
spicuous is the heavy traffic between other American Manufacturing
Belt 6 centers, on the one hand, and Chicago, New York, and the Pacific
Coast on the other. Below this traffic level, there is a considerable fall-
off, as witness the many small circles, particularly on the Chicago and
the Los Angeles maps. This magnitude map has been used to construct
a base map for the consideration of each airline's share of traffic. For
cartographic clarity, the discrepancies in traffic shown on Figure 1 have
been reduced by categorizing the 99 city pairs into three size groups
based on March and September, 1956 passenger-miles. These size
6 The American Manufacturing Belt as it is commonly delimited by geographers
consists of the cities within a rectangle bounded roughly by Milwaukee and St. Louis
on the West; Boston and Baltimore on the East.
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gToups correspond to the dark-shaded, light-shaded and unshaded circles
in Figure 1. All the remaining maps are drawn on the categorized base.
Competitive breakdowns will be represented by pie charts within the
circles for four different years. Text comments will attempt to point
out significant competitive characteristics and changes reflected in each
of these traffic maps.
Comments on the September, 1940 Map
Figure 2 represents airline competition in September, 1940. 7 The
size of each circle represents the magnitude of the particular city pair
as determined by 1956 passenger-miles. The September, 1940 figures
are represented by the breakdown within the circle, which gives the
percentage share of each airline. The red patterns represent members
of the Big Four; the black and white patterns represent regional car-
riers; 8 the blank circles or circle sectors represent connecting services
involving more than one carrier. For instance, the large circle at LAX
on the New York map indicates that Los Angeles-New York falls in the
largest size group on the basis of March, 1956 passenger milesY The
breakdown within the circle indicates that, in September, 1940, TWA
was the leading carrier of Los Angeles-New York passengers with 43
per cent, American Airlines was second with 28 per cent, United Air-
lines was third with 11 per cent, and the remaining 18 per cent traveled
via connecting carriers.
The most striking features of the September, 1940 maps of the
leading city pairs are: the dominance of the Big Four, the general
absence of competition, and the prevalence of connecting flights. The
many blank circles and circle sectors, particularly on the Los Angeles
and Miami maps, indicate the weak development of many of the routes
which had become premium city pairs by 1956. Both local and area
monopolies appear on the maps. Services to the Southeast from the
Eastern Seaboard as well as from Chicago were dominated by Eastern
Airlines; American generally dominated services to the Southwest,
particularly from the Eastern Seaboard and the Pacific Coast. United
monopolized the intra-Pacific Coast traffic, as well as the external con-
nections of San Francisco and the Pacific Northwest. Local monopolies
were evident in the control by different members of the Big Four indi-
vidual large centers. American was the only carrier providing service
7 Only September origin-destination figures were available for 1940. All other
years include data for two survey months (or half-months) : March and September.
8 The term "regional carrier" is used in this study for the smaller trunklines
(Capital, Northeast, National, Delta, Braniff, Continental, Western and North-
west); Big Four refers to American, United, TWA and Eastern. Only single car-
rier service as recorded in the origin-destination survey is credited to each carrier.
Interchange services are regarded as connecting services. Its share of connecting
traffic is merely grouped with all connecting traffic. The pie chart breakdown is
arranged so that the airline with the largest share is always shown in the upper
right quadrant with the other airlines ranked in clockwise order. Percentages of
less than five per cent are not shown on the map.
9 The standard three-letter airline code is used on the map with the following
exceptions: HT-Hartford; WAS-Washington; CMB-Columbus; LOU-Louisville;
DET-Detroit; NO-New Orleans; KC-Kansas City.
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over Detroit, Boston and Buffalo routes as well as over routes to the
Ohio Valley centers of Cincinnati and Louisville. United dominated
Cleveland traffic in eastern United States, Denver in western United
States. TWA dominated Dayton and Pittsburgh in the east, Kansas
City in the west. There was already, however, intra-Big Four competi-
tion on some of the high-density routes. Los Angeles-New York and
New York-Chicago were served by three carriers providing effective
competition. Two-carrier Big Four competition was present over some
of the Chicago and the St. Louis routes as well as the New York-
Washington route.
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- September, 1940
The regional carriers were quite insignificant on the pre-war map,
providing effective (10 per cent) competition'0 on only four routes,
all on the Chicago map. (Braniff's services to Kansas City and Dallas;
Chicago and Southern's services to -St. Louis; and Northwest's services
to Seattle.) There were also five monopoly routes controlled by regional
carriers (Braniff's Chicago-San Antonio and Chicago-Houston traffic,
Northwest's Chicago-Minneapolis, Capital's Washington-Detroit, and
10 Gill and Bates, op. cit., and others have used the 10 per cent figure as an
arbitrary measure of effective competition. It will be used throughout as the
criterion for separating one-, two- and three-carrier pairs.
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Western's Las Vegas-Los Angeles) . It is interesting to note- that no
regional carriers whatsoever were recorded on either the New York
or the Miami maps.
The prominence of the Big Four in air traffic of the leading city
pairs is emphasized by Table 1. Of the total passenger-miles of the 99
pairs on Figure 1, the Big Four accounted for fully 95 per cent. A
significant aspect of this degree of concentration is that the Big Four
had a higher percentage of the premium market passenger miles than
they did of all passenger-mils 'The regional carriers had less than
five per cent of the premium market passenger-miles, although they
accounted for 17 per cent of all passenger-miles in 1940. The second
part of the table emphasizes the lack of airline competition in 1940.
TABLE 1
AIRLINE PERCENTAGE SHARE PASSENGER-MILES: 1940*
100 City Pairs Total
(Sept.) (Year)
Airline Per Cent Per Cent Difference
American 36.35 29.96 + 6.39
United 26.19 21.37 + 4.82
Trans World 20.87 14.92 + 5.95
Eastern 12.92 15.20 - 2.29
Big Four 95.33 81.45 +13.88
Capital 1.08 3.60 - 2.52
National - 0.46 - 0.46
Northwest 2.40 4.91 - 2.51
Delta 0.52 2.79 - 2.27
Western 0.20 1.51 - 1.31
Braniff 0.44 4.07 - 3.63
Northeast - 0.39 - 0.39
Regional Carriers 4.66 17.73 -13.07
No-Carrier One-Carrier Two-Carrier Three-Carrier
Pairs Pairs Pairs Pairs
Big Four Only - 55 6 2
Regional Carrier
Only - 5 - -
Big Four-
Regional Carrier - - 4 -
Total 27 60 10 2
* Airline percentages for the 100 city pairs were computed from the total
single-carrier passenger-miles represented by the 99 pairs used as the basis for this
study; total airline percentages were computed from the annual passenger-mile
totals for all domestic trunklines. Since the latter includes such airlines as Colonial
and Continental which are not represented among the 100 city pairs the figures in
the table will represent something less than 100 percent of the total. This fact as
well as errors due to rounding figures account for most apparent discrepancies in
this series of tables. Both in the tables and on the maps, figures for Delta and
Chicago and Southern have been combined and reported as Delta figures for those
years preceding the merger of the two airlines. Annual figures were taken from:
Civil Aeronautics Board, Office of Carrier Accounts and Statistics, Certificated Air
Carrier Mileage and Traffic Data.
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Twenty-seven of the city pairs had connecting services only. Of the
lemaining 72 with single-carrier service, 60 were one-carrier pairs (55
of these Big Four), 10 were two-carrier pairs, and only two were three-
carrier pairs.
The 1940 pattern may thus be considered a "grandfather" pattern
inherited in large measure by the Board and used as a base on which
to erect a structure of airline competition. The premium markets were
almost completely dominated by the Big Four and most of the city
pairs were non-competitive.
Comments on the 1949 Map
Figure 3, the 1949 map, presents the pattern at the end of a period
during which large-scale commercial air transportation had come into
being. Considerable competition had been added to the 1940 grand-
father pattern. In particular, this consisted of competition between the
Big Four and the regional carriers stemming from the series of cases
decided during and shortly after the War. Wartime CAB decisions in
effect created new trunkline competitors by strengthening and drasti-
cally altering the nature of many small pre-war carriers such as
National, Capital (then Pennsylvania-Central), Delta and Western.
Many regional and local Big Four monopolies became subject to
regional carrier competition. Note on the New York and Chicago maps
how Eastern's monopoly of services to Florida and the Southeast became
competitive as National received an extension to New York and Delta
received an extension to Chicago. United lost its regional monopolies
when Northwest became competitive in %the New York-Pacific North-
west market and Western appeared on the Los Angeles map as a com-
petitor for intra-Pacific Coast traffic. Capital's extension to Chicago
removed a number of local monopolies within the American Manu-
facturing Belt. Note on the New York and Chicago maps how Capital
became competitive with American, United and TWA-respectively at
each of their principal intermediate stops between New York and
Chicago (Detroit for American; Cleveland for United; Pittsburgh
for TWA). Remaining area monopoly elements included Eastern's
continued dominance of much of the Southeast (on the New York
map, Atlanta, New Orleans and Houston traffic), and American's
dominance of much of the Southwest (Dallas on both the New York
and Los Angeles maps). Among the few remaining local monopolies
were American's Buffalo service (New York map) and United's Denver
services (New York, Chicago and Los Angeles map).
Table 2 indicates the extent to which the regional carriers had
become competitive with the Big Four by the early post-war period.
The regional carriers accounted for 17 per cent of the leading city pair
passenger miles as compared to only 4 per cent in 1940. All seven of
the regional carriers increased their share of these premium markets.
The Big Four dropped from 96 per cent to 83 per cent with American
registering the steepest decline (from 36 per cent to 25 per cent as
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traffic to Boston, Detroit and the Ohio Valley cities became competi-
tive) . Eastern was the only member of the Big Four to increase its share
of the premium market traffic since 1940. This increase is deceptive,
however, since most of it is due to seasonality. Figures for 1940 included
only September, a seasonal low for Florida; figures for 1949 included
both September and March.
Despite a major reduction, however, there persisted a consistent
discrepancy between airline participation in total passenger miles and
in premium market passenger-miles as is indicated in the column
labeled "Difference." There was a discrepancy of over 10 per cent
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-March and September, 1949
between the Big Four's 83 per cent share of the premium markets and
its 73 per cent share of the total market. All of the Big Four registered
larger shares of the premium markets than of the total market, as
compared to only two of the seven regional carriers. The second part
of Table 2 shows further the extent to which competition increased
among the 99 city pairs from 1940 to 1949. Monopoly city pairs were
nearly halved (from 60 to 33) and two-carrier city pairs became the
largest group with an increase of from 10 to 50. The technological
maturing of air transportation is indicated by the fact that the number
of city pairs which had only connecting services was reduced from 27
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
TABLE 2
AIRLINE PERCENTAGE SHARE PASSENGER-MILES: 1949
100 City Pairs Total
(Sept. & March) (Year)
Change
from Change in
Airline Per Cent 1940 Per Cent Difference Difference
American 24.90 -11.45 23.28 + 1.62
United 22.98 - 3.21 19.60 + 3.38
Trans World 18.21 - 2.66 14.37 + 3.84
Eastern 17.12 + 4.20 15.42 + 1.70
Big Four 83.21 -12.12 72.67 +10.54 -3.34
Capital 3.59 + 2.51 5.43 - 1.87
National 3.03 + 3.03 2.61 + 0.42
Northwest 5.52 + 3.13 6.49 - 0.97
Delta 1.51 + 1.00 4.88 - 3.37
Western 1.88 + 1.68 1.60 + 0.28
Braniff 1.06 + 0.62 4.57 - 3.51
Northeast 0.19 + 0.19 0.95 - 0.76
Regional Carriers 16.78 +12.12 26.53 - 9.75 +3.32
No- One- Two- Three-
Car- Car- Car- Car-
1949 ier Change tier Change tier Change tier Change
Big Four Only - - 28 -27 21 +15 5 +3
Regional Carrier
Only - - 5 0 1 1 0 0
Big Four-
Regional Carrier - - 28 +24 3 +3
Total 8 -19 33 -27 50 +40 8 +6
to 8. In terms of Big Four regional carrier competition, the table indi-
cated that in 1949 there was a fairly even division between the three
major categories, of city pairs; Big Four monopolies, (28) ; Big Four-
regional carrier two-carrier pairs (also 28) ; Big Four two-carrier pairs
(21).
Comments on the 1954 Map
Figure 4, the 1954 map, represents the pattern of airline competi-
tion at the end of a period of relative stability, despite rapidly increas-
ing traffic. According to Bates, the period from 1947 to 1954 was a
static one during which the CAB had engaged in little direct promotion
of competition as compared to the dynamic period of increased compe-
tition from 1938 to 1947.11 It is probable that the Board's attitude
toward competition was colored by its desire to end airline subsidy, an
11 Bates, op. cit., used a number of measures to show that airline competition
increased greatly from 1938 to 1947, remained static from 1947 to 1954 and
increased again in 1955.
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objective which had, in large measure, been achieved by 1954. Chief
problems faced by the Board during this period included mergers,
interchanges, non-scheduled and local service airlines. Action, with
respect to the first:three of these, had a deterrent effect on additional
competition. Mergers reduced the total number of potential competi-
tors; interchange agreements were sometimes recommended in lieu of
route extension 12 (note on the Miami map that Los Angeles-Miami is
still without single-carrier service); and further expansion of non-
scheduled airlines was discouraged. To a certain extent, the support
of mergers designed to strengthen weak carriers might be considered
as having a promotional effect on competition, at least within the
leading city pairs, since none of the merged carriers provided effective
competition to each other in a premium market. Action with respect
to local service carriers had a promotional effect on competition al-
though not among the 99 leading city pairs. ,
The pattern of competitive change from the 1949 to the 1954 map
was quite restricted. Regional carriers either dominated or provided
effective competition in 37 markets, the same as in 1949. Probably the
most striking change has been the development of National into a
strong competitor in markets formerly dominated by Eastern. National
approximately doubled its share of Miami traffic from the big Eastern
Seaboard centers (see Miami on the New York map; Philadelphia and
Washington on the Miami map). One change of secondary importance
appears on the Los Angeles map where a route extension gave Western
a monopoly on single-carrier service to Minneapolis.
Three of the other regional carriers registered declines in important
markets, Northwest (on the New York map, decreases of 22 per cent at
Seattle, 16 per cent at Minneapolis); Braniff (on the Chicago map,
decreases of 22 per cent at Houston, four per cent at San Antonio and
Dallas) ; and Capital (a number of 6-8 per cent decreases on the New
York and Chicago maps, and a decrease of 11 per cent in the New York-
Chicago market). Capital's reduced share of the Chicago-New York
traffic was symptomatic of its difficulties during this period, when the
widespread introduction of coach fares had offset the competitive
advantage gained by Capital in initiating these services in 1948.
Table 3 confirms the visual impression of competitive stability
among the 99 leading city pairs. The principal change in share of the
total premium market, the large increases recorded by Eastern and
National, was associated with the boom in Florida traffic. Big Four
regional carrier relationships changed only slightly as the Big Four
share of the leading markets dropped 1 per cent to 81.89 per cent.
Three of the seven regional carriers registered increases, with National's
increase of 3.90 per cent by far the largest. All of the Big Four still had
larger shares of the premium market than of the total market, although
12 See Aaron J. Gellman, "The Regulation of Competition in United States Air
Transportation: A Judicial Survey and Analysis-II," in this issue of the JOURNAL
OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE.
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the difference in the case of TWA had become slight. Again all of the
regional carriers but National and Western had lower shares of the
premium market than of the total market. The proportion of one-,
two- and three-carrier city pairs remained remarkably stable (34; 49;
11; as opposed to the previous 33; 50; 8). The two dominant categories
of city pairs were still Big Four monopolies (30) and Big Four-regional
carrier two-carrier pairs (28). Two-carrier Big Four pairs dropped
somewhat from 21 to 18.
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The early post-war competitive p)attern had thus remained virtually
unchanged through a period of increased traffic, initiation of coach
fares, pressures from non-scheduled carriers and a marked movement
away from subsidy on the part of the certificated carriers. The few
competitive changes which did occur were related more closely to such
basic trends as increased Florida resort travel rather than to CAB deci-
sions. The stage was set for the next round of decisions designed to
increase competition.
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TABLE 3
AIRLINE PERCENTAGE SHARE PASSENGER-MILES: 1954
100 City Pairs Total
(Sept. & March) (Year)
Change
from Change in
Airline Per Cent 1949 Per Cent Difference Difference
American 22.18 -2.72 20.76 +1.42
United 21.96 -1.01 19.30 +2.66
Trans World 16.47 -1.74 16.08 +0.39
Eastern 21.28 +4.16 17.53 +3.85
Big Four 81.89 -1.32 76.67 +8.30 -2.24
Capital 2.15 -1.44 4.59 -2.44
National 6.93 +3.90 4.27 +2.66
Northwest 3.32 -2.20 4.61 -1.29
Delta 2.36 +0.85 4.84 -2.48
Western 2.78 +0.90 2.47 +0.31
Braniff 0.47 -0.59 3.23 -2.76
Northeast 0.09 -0.10 0.64 -0.55
Regional Carriers 18.10 +1.32 24.65 -6.58 +3.17
No- One- Two- Three-
Car- Car- Car- Car-
1954 rier Change rier Change ier Change tier Change
Big Four Only - - 30 +2 18 -1 9 +4
Regional Carrier
Only - - 4 -1 3 +2 - -
Big Four-
Regional Carrier - - - - 28 0 2 -1
Total 5 -3 34 +1 49 -1 11 +3
Comments on the 1956 Map
The pattern of airline competition on the 1956 map (Figure 5)
shows a marked change from that of 1949 and 1954. The greater
cartographic complexity is associated with increased competition; the
greater prominence of the black and white patterns is associated with
the improved position of the regional carriers. Both of these are linked
to the Board's 1955-1956 decisions, particularly the New York-Chicago
Case, the Denver Service Case, and the Southwest-Northeast Case.13 The
1956 map represents the initial impact of some, but not all of these de-
13 Civil Aeronautics Board Order No. E-937, New York-Chicago Case, Docket
No. 986, et. al., dated September 1, 1955 (mimeographed decision); Civil Aero-
nautics Board Order No. E-9785, Southwest-Northeast Service Case, Docket No.
2355, et. al., dated November 21, 1955 (mimeographed decision) ; Civil Aeronautics
Board Order No. 9735, Denver Service Case, Docket No. 1841, et. al., dated Novem-
ber 14, 1955 (mimeographed decision). Other cases include: Civil Aeronautics
Board Order No. E-10645, New York-Florida Case, Docket No. 3051, et. al., dated
September 28, 1956 (mimeographed decision) and Civil Aeronautics Board Order
No. E-10487, Tucson Airport Authority Application, Docket No. 5564, July 7, 1956(mimeographed decision). Later a Civil Aeronautics Board press release dated
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cisions.14 The policy of strengthening the weak carrier seems to have had
the greatest effect on the map, although increased intra-Big Four compe-
tition is also evident.' In order to emphasize the competitive changes
which have occurred in the New York and Chicago maps since 1954,
Figure 6 has also been prepared. Pie sectors on this map represent
increases of more than 5 per cent in competitive share. On the New
York map, for instance, the sectors in the Detroit circle indicate that
Capital has increased its share of total Detroit-New York traffic by
12 per cent (from 5 per cent to 17 per cent), and that TWA has
increased its share by 8 per cent (from 0 to 8 per cent). The prevalence
of black and white patterns on Figure 6 further emphasizes the im-
proved competitive position of the regional carriers relative to the Big
Four. All but a few of the red patterns on the competitive increase
map are associated with intra-Big Four competition, chiefly on western
routes.
One of the most interesting and conspicuous examples of a weak
carrier which has been strengthened is to be found in the increased
prominence within the Manufacturing Belt of the dark pattern repre-
senting Capital Airlines. On the New York inset on Figure 5, Ameri-
can's local monopoly of the New York-Buffalo city pair was eliminated
when Capital entered the market with fully 28 per cent of the traffic;
on the Chicago inset, Capital entered the Chicago-Philadelphia market
as a third carrier with a 14 per cent share. Gains associated in part
with the removal of operating restrictions were registered by Capital
at other important Manufacturing Belt centers, such as Pittsburgh,
Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee and Minneapolis. These
gains, ranging from 6 to 16 per cent, are particularly evident on Figure
6, the competitive increase map. Outside of the Manufacturing Belt,
Capital's Southeastern service to New York resulted in a 10 per cent
gain at New Orleans, 24 per cent at Atlanta. That this was not a transi-
tory phenomenon is evident from the fact that further gains were
registered in March 1957. The increase in Capital's share of the pre-
mium market passenger-miles from 2.15 to 4.49 (see Table 4) is by no
means a simple result of CAB policy, however. A closer look at Capital's
traffic indicates that the competitive impact of the Vicker's Viscount
was also a vital factor. The competitive share graphs in Figure 7 show
Capital's percentage of the traffic of its major city pairs for each March
and September from 1948 through 1956. The remarkable upsurge of
Capital in the 1956 section of each of these graphs follows the initiation
of Viscount service, represented by a small "v" on the graph. The
Chicago-Washington route (and to a lesser extent the Chicago-Cleve-
March 31, 1958 indicated that considerable competition had been added to the
Miami map with the decisions in the Great Lakes-Southeast Service Case, the
St. Louis-Southeast Service Case, and the TWA-Cincinnati-Detroit Route Transfer
Case. Other cases being considered at the time of writing include Dallas Service to
the West and a southern transcontinental.
14 Although only the 1956 figures were mapped, origin-destination figures for
March, 1957, which became available before completion of the study, have been
incorporated in the text discussion.
15 Gellman, op. cit., (Part I), p. 427.
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land route) effectively exemplifies the three phases in the ebb and flow
of Capital's fortunes since 1948. First came the period through 1950
when the early initiation of coach fares helped Capital maintain its
leadership over American; secondly, the period from 1952 through
1954 when American expanded coach services, and dominated the mar-
ket; thirdly, Capital's revival in 1955 with the initiation of Viscount
services. By March 1957 this dominance had increased from 42 to 55
per cent while American's share had dropped to 17 per cent.
Further evidence of the policy of strengthening the weak carrier is
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- March 'and September, 1956
to be found both on Figure 5 and Figure 6 on the New York inset.
The last two regional monopolies, Eastern's in parts of the Southeast,
and American's in the Southwest were virtually eliminated, largely
through the decisions in the Southwest-Northeast Case. Note the sizable
share of Delta and Capital in the Atlanta and New Orleans markets,
both of which had been virtually monopolized by Eastern. American
lost 17 per cent of its New York-Dallas traffic to Braniff, and a later
decision brought TWA into the Tucson market. The 1956 map is
misleading in that it represents only the initial impact of Delta and




Figure 6 - Increase in Competitive Share: 1954 to 1956
Braniff on the above markets. By March 1957, Delta had gained an
additional 18 per cent of the Atlanta-New York traffic, Braniff an addi-
tional 12 per cent of the Dallas-New York market. Although not evident
on the 1956 map, it is probable that awards to other regional carriers
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Figure 7 - Competitive Share Graphs: Capital Airlines
such as Northeast's Florida routes, Continental's Chicago-Denver and
Chicago-Los Angeles routes, and Western's Denver-San Francisco routes
will ultimately result in effective competition.
The feeling that increased competition in general was needed
appears to have been the principal motive in creating increased com-
.100
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JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
TABLE 4
AIRLINE PERCENTAGE SHARE PASSENGER-MILES: 1956
100 City Pairs Total
(Sept. & March) (Year)
Change
from Change in
Airline Per Cent 1954 Per Cent Difference Difference
American 21.84 -0.34 22.14 -0.30
United 20.94 -1.02 19.53 +1.41
Trans World 15.25 -1.22 15.06 +0.19
Eastern 21.65 +0.37 17.50 +4.15
Big Four 79.68 -2.21 74.23 +5.45 -2.85
Capital 4.49 +2.34 4.71 -0.22
National 7.16 +0.23 4.36 +2.90
Northwest 2.97 -0.35 4.02 -1.05
Delta 2.61 +0.25 5.19 -2.58
Western 2.21 -0.57 2.11 +0.10
Braniff 0.78 +0.30 3.31 -2.54
Northeast 0.09 - 0.55 -0.46
Regional Carriers 20.32 +2.22 24.23 -3.91 +2.67
No- One- Two- Three-
Car- Car- Car- Car-
1956 ier Change rier Change rier Change tier Change
Big Four Only - - 22 -8 23 +5 10 +1
Regional Carrier
Only - - 3 -1 3 0 - -
Big Four-
Regional Carrier - - - - 30 +2 3 +1
Total 5 0 25 -9 56 +7 13 +2
petition among the Big Four, either by new certifications or the lifting
of restrictions. A great deal of this comprised competition between
TWA and United in an unusual pattern of reciprocal awards. The
entry of TWA eliminated United's local monopoly of Kansas City
services to New York and Los Angeles, as well as Pittsburgh services to
Los Angeles. In addition, TWA joined Capital as a United competitor
on the New York-Cleveland route; United joined Capital as a TWA
competitor on the Chicago-Pittsburgh route. On the competitive in-
crease map, five of the Big Four increases are associated with this
musical chairs pattern. These awards illustrate the difficulties involved
in striving for an equitable distribution of new awards. In these in-
stances, carriers were compensated for being subjected to additional
competition in some markets by being certificated as new competitors
in other markets. a6
Another aspect of intra-Big Four competition worthy of mention
is the addition of a third Big Four carrier to another major California
16 Ibid., p. 432 has further discussion of these awards.
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market. On the Chicago map, American entered the San Francisco
market with a surprisingly high 32 per cent. Thus, nine out of a total
of 13 three-carrier pairs now involved California traffic. An interesting
feature of this traffic is the vigorous competition between the Big Four.
As the competitive share graphs in Figure 8 indicate, the Los Angeles
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Only a few monopolies remain on the 1956 map. One group is
that of the seasonal city pairs (Tucson and Florida traffic), many of
which would probably not be ranked among the 99 leading city pairs
if twelve-month origin-destination figures were available. After 1956,
however, the Tucson routes became competitive with the addition of
TWA, and, in 1958, a series of CAB decisions markedly altered the
Miami map by adding a competitor (a regional carrier or TWA) to
most of the Manufacturing Belt routes to Florida which were Eastern
monopolies in 1956.
Other monopolies on the 1956 map were Dallas-Los Angeles (Amer-
ican), New York and Los Angeles to Dayton (TWA), and the three
regional-carrier monopolies: Chicago-Minneapolis (Northwest) ; Los
Angeles-Minneapolis (Western); and Miami-Cincinnati (Delta). The
survival of the regional carrier monopolies may be taken as another
manifestation of the policy of strengthening the weak carrier. The
Dallas-Los Angeles market, as well as three of the five city pairs without
single-carrier service save in the form of interchange (Miami to San
Francisco and Los Angeles; Houston to Los Angeles), were involved at
the time of writing in proceedings designed to provide additional
Dallas to the West Coast services and to consider the possibility of
establishing a southern transcontinental route. Although this latter had
earlier been rejected in the favor of interchange, there was, by 1958,
evidence that single-carrier service between Florida and California was
imminent.
Table 4 indicates that in 1956 the Big Four still dominated the
99 leading city pairs. They accounted for 79.68 per cent of the premium
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
market passenger-miles, a drop of 2.21 per cent since 1954.1' There
was actually a very slight increase in Big Four dominance of total
passenger-miles in 1956. It is possible that the continuation of this
degree of domination by the Big Four, in the face of an increasing
regional-carrier share in many new markets, is associated with a re-
shuffling of available equipment, reducing regional-carrier participa-
tion in lesser markets. The Big Four also continued to have a larger
share of the premium market traffic than of the total traffic, although
this discrepancy had declined from 8.30 per cent in 1954 to 5.45 per
cent. However, one of the Big Four, American, had reached the point
where its share of the premium markets had dropped below its share
of the total markets. This slight drop in overall Big Four domination
continued in March, 1957, when the Big Four total was 77 per cent as
compared to 78 per cent in March, 1956, and 79 per cent in March of
1954.
Most of the regional carriers experienced a slight increase in their
share of the premium markets. Northwest and Western were the only
regional carriers to decline in their share of the premium-market
passenger miles. As was evident from visual inspection, Capital had
the greatest increase in both absolute and relative terms. Its increase
of 2.34 per cent more than doubled its 1954 figure. It should also be
noted that the small increases for Delta and Braniff were modified by
the later competitive resurgence described above. Nonetheless, the only
two regional carriers which had a greater share of the premium-market
passenger miles were still National and Western, just as in 1954 and
1949. The number of premium markets in which regional carriers
offered effective competition had only increased from 37 to 40.
The overall structure of one, two, and three carrier city pairs did
not change greatly. However, as emphasized in Figure 9, which shows
those categories since 1940, there was enough change to indicate the
prevalence of the two-carrier pairs. The number of one-carrier pairs
had decreased considerably, and the number of three-carrier pairs had
increased only slightly.'8 The most common single category of city pair
was the Big Four-regional carrier two-carrier pair. There were 31 of
these, as compared to 22 Big Four monopolies and 23 Big Four two-
carrier pairs. The cumulative pattern of change since before the war
in these categories is shown is Figure 10, which gives the number of
each, arranged from left to right in order of 1956 rank. The sharpest
contrast in Figure 10, as in Figure 9, is, of course, that between the
pre-war curve, when the 99 city pairs were dominated by Big Four
monopolies, and the post-war curves, which are relatively closely
grouped. The general direction of change to 1956 has been for the Big
Four-regional carrier category to increase at the expense of the Big
17 Both on the map and in the tables, the effects of the Western Airlines' pilot
strike, which eliminated that airline from the March, 1956 figures, has been modified
by pro-rating 1956 totals according to 1954 percentage shares for those city pairs
involving Western.
18 Although in terms of premium-market passenger-miles, three-carrier pairs
accounted for 26 per cent.
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Four monopoly category, with a slight but steady increase in the three-
carrier Big Four category.
Summary
The set of maps portraying airline competition within the 99 lead-
ing city pairs for selected years, thus shows the development of compe-
tition in two waves of expansion. Some competition retrogression was
evident in the static period between these two waves. The second
expansion wave has to date been of considerably less magnitude than
the first, although the full effects of the later decisions have not yet
evidenced themselves in origin-destination data.
In terms of the entire 99 city pairs, it could be said that it had
taken approximately ten years since the beginning of the era of large-
scale commercial air transportation for competition to spread through
the premium markets. Both regional and local monopolies were vir-
tually eliminated by 1956. The only major exceptions to this, the
Florida routes, were made competitive by later decisions. The dis-
crepancy between Big Four participation in the premium markets and
in the total market had also been reduced during the ten year period.
It should be noted, however, that the Big Four still controlled nearly
80 per cent of the 1956 premium-market traffic, and that there still
persisted a discrepancy between this and a 74 per cent share of the
total market.
The most conspicuous thread of CAB policy running through both
the first and the second waves of competitive increase has been that of
strengthening the weak carrier. Regional carriers increased their share
of the premium market passenger-miles and provided effective compe-
tition to the Big Four in an increased number of the 99 leading
markets. In addition, some regional-carrier monopolies remained intact
and there were few instances where additional competition between
regional carriers was certificated. The idea of strengthening the weak
carrier was also important in the later decisions, adding regional car-
riers to many Florida routes. Closely intertwined with the strengthen-
ing of the weak carriers has been the Board's desire to end subsidy and
to either help weak regional carriers off subsidy or keep them from
reverting to a subsidized status. To a degree the mergers in the static
competitive period were designed to strengthen the surviving regional
carriers so as to reduce their subsidy needs.
The competition maps also reflect many competitive changes which
are not related to the policy of strengthening the weak carrier. It is
probable that the end of subsidy has been associated with the increase
of intra-Big Four competition. The element of compensation has also
been prominent in many route awards, particularly in the instances
where United and TWA entered a number of each other's markets.
These and such other complicating factors as incident awards" and
19 Richmond, op. cit., p. 439, discusses such awards which refer to the appar-
ently unintentional certification of additional competition on low density routes as
a by-product of an additional certification on a major city pair.
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rapidly changing traffic levels emphasize the difficulties of establishing
volume-based norms for the number of competitors. No consistent
evidence of such norms was noted on the traffic maps despite scattered
references to volume as a certification criterion in Board decisions.20
Managerial factors are also evident on the maps as significant factors
in apportioning the share of traffic on individual routes. The remark-
able, competitive impact of Capital's Viscount is an outstanding exam-
ple of the importance of the equipment aspects of service competition
(or product differentiation) in air transportation. The growth of
National during a competitively static period is an example of a com-
petitor which had been certified over many routes for some time before
becoming a serious threat to the original carrier. The presence on many
city pairs of certified carriers with less than a 10 per cent share of the
market is an indication of the importance of managerial decision as to
route participation.2 It might be said that regulatory policy sets the
limits of potential competition within which managerial decision sets
the extent of actual competition. This is, in part, a contrast between
the short-run and the long-run effects of added competition, although
effective competition has not yet materialized from a number of com-
petitive authorizations.
In terms of 10 per cent participation representing effective com-
petition, the 99 city pairs were, by 1956, dominated by two-carrier
pairs. Many of the one-carrier pairs were Florida routes, many of the
three-carrier pairs were California routes. The anticipated trend toward
three- and four-carrier pairs as dominant types was not yet evident in
the 1956 data for the 99 city pairs, although potential three-carrier
competition was now present on many routes and a small but steady
increase in three-carrier pairs had been evident from 1949 to 1956.
The characteristic 1956 city pair had two effective competitors, usually
one regional carrier and one Big Four carrier. Most of the awards in
the later Florida decisions were also of this nature. Of secondary im-
portance were Big Four monopolies and Big Four two-carrier pairs.
In the second part of this study, one-, two-, and three-carrier city
pairs will thus comprise the competitive frame of reference for eval-
uating differences in traffic growth characteristics. Periods investigated
will be 1949-1954 and 1954-1956. Pre-war to post-war changes in com-
petitive structure were so sweeping (see figures 8 and 9) that analysis
of this period would seem to be of dubious value.
20 For instance, in the New York-Chicago Case, Docket No. 986, et. al., dated
September 1, 1955 (mimeographed decision) are contained the following: New
York-Detroit is cited as having the size and potential for three turn-arounds instead
of one (p. 7) ; a figure of 60,000 passengers is cited as evidence of need for a second
Detroit-Philadelphia carrier (p. 16); the Cleveland-New York total is regarded
as being too small to support a third carrier (p. 19).
21 Richmond, op. cit., p. 436.
